Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 3

Article 5

June 1951

Recent Illinois Decisions
Chicago-Kent Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Recent Illinois Decisions, 29 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 277 (1951).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol29/iss3/5

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
COSTs-TAxATION-WHETHER

COSTS

INCURRED

IN

ORDER

TO

OVER-

COME DEFENSES NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH MAY BE TAXED AT AN EX-PARTE

HEAxRNG--Little use appears to have been made of Section 41 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act,1 if absence of appellate records may be considered to be any indication of infrequent trial court practice, although
a judge once offered the opinion that the imposition of penalties under
the statute would soon cause untrue defenses to disappear. 2 The decision
in Adams v. Silfen3 indicates that it would be improper to assess costs
for an untruthful defense, if one should be offered, except at the time
of the trial and then only after proper notice of an intention to make
application for an award. The plaintiff there, on petition filed long after
the hearing and at an ex parte hearing before another judge than the
one who presided at the trial, secured an order taxing the defendant with
certain costs and attorney's fees allegedly incurred in overcoming certain
allegations and denials made by the defendant supposedly without reasonable cause, not in good faith, and found to be untrue.'
The Appellate
Court for the First District reversed such order on the ground that the
statute was penal in character and no recovery could be permitted under
it except upon full compliance with its terms. Although the section
calls for a "summary" taxation of costs, it was said not to warrant ex
parte action but rather to require that an opportunity be provided to
be heard on the question of whether costs should be taxed or not. It
was also said that the power to tax costs was vested in the trial judge
alone since only he would possess the knowledge necessary to permit of
summary disposition of the matter. The utility of the provision would
seem to be a matter of some doubt unless it could be said to possess some
prophylactic value from its mere presence on the statute book.
1 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 165.

2 Fisher, "The Persistence of Chitty," 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 359 (1939), particularly
p. 372.
3 342 Ill. App. 415, 96 N. E. (2d) 628 (1951).
4 Other cases interpreting the statute may be found in Hausman Steel Co. v. N. P.
Severin Co., 316 Ill. App. 585, 45 N. E. (2d) 552 (1942), and Palmer v. Gillarde, 312
Ill. App. 230, 38 N. E. (2d) 352 (1942), but to date there has been no recorded case
in which a penalty under the statute has been successfully imposed. It should be
noted that the permissible recovery is described as the "reasonable expenses" of the
opposite party. Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno., 1933, pp. 87-8, suggests this phrase may
include attorneys' fees. There has been no expression to date interpreting this
aspect of the statute.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-PROCEEDINGS--WHETHER

OR NOT TIME FOR

APPEAL IN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROCEEDING IS TO BE MEASURED BY

LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RULE--The Illinois Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal in Freeport Motor Casualty Company v. Tharp'
solely to settle a question as to the timeliness of an appeal from a declaratory judgment order entered pursuant to the recently enacted declaratory
judgment statute. 2 The proceeding had been one to secure a declaration
as to an insurance company's obligations under a public liability policy.
APPLICABLE

The trial judge, being absent from the county, mailed a written judgment
order, under date of June 15th, to the clerk of the court with direction
to make the usual docket entry "the next day there is court in Louisville,"
that place being the county seat. The order was received by the clerk of
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day. Notice of appeal was filed on September 22nd, well within the ninetyday period 3 measured from June 24th but more than the statutory time
allowed if the order could be said to have been entered on June 16th.
The Appellate Court had rejected a motion to dismiss the appeal and
had disposed of the case on the merits. The Supreme Court agreed that
such action had been proper.
It is clear that the commencement of the period for appeal varies
depending on the nature of the action brought, for a law judgment becomes
4
final the moment it is pronounced even though not recorded until later,
whereas an equity decree attains the force of a binding decree for this
purpose only after it has been signed and enrolled.- Inasmuch as a declaratory judgment proceeding is sui juris,6 it became necessary for the
court to determine the exact point when the period for appeal would
begin to run in such a case. In that regard, and for this purpose, the
court concluded that the declaratory judgment proceeding should take
the same character as would a suit based on the same facts but seeking
positive relief instead of a mere declaration of rights. As the instant
case appeared to be, in essence, a law action based on a contract, the court
1406 Il. 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 139 (1950), affirming 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N. E. (2d)
499 (1949). Fulton, J., dissented.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 200, requires that no appeal, as a matter of right, shall be taken
"after the expiration of ninety days" from the "entry" of the order, decree or
judgment. It does not elaborate on the acts which constitute "entry."
4 People v. Jarecki, 352 Ill. 207, 185 N. E. 570 (1933).

Snook v. Shaw, 315 IIl. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGOSee also Hughes v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245 (1872), and
Jones v. City of Carterville, 340 Il1. App. 330, 91 N. E. (2d) 604 (1950).
6 Progressive Party v. Flynn, 400 Ill. 102, 79 N. E. (2d) 516 (1948) ; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, 118 F. (2d) 232 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 637, 62 S. Ct.
71, 86 L. Ed. 511 (1941).
5
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applied legal rather than equitable concepts to fix the time for appeal.7
The holding may be indicative of a line of thought to be applied with
regard to other procedural problems which may arise in declaratory
judgment matters. 8
The court did, however, note that the statute fixes a period which
commences with the "entry" of the judgment rather than with its rendition. If a law judge pronounces judgment while present in open court
in the county in which the case is pending and at a time when the court
is in full and proper session, the appeal period, following the law rule,
would immediately begin to run as the ministerial act of "entering" the
judgment would be presumed to have occurred contemporaneously with
the rendition of the judgment. If, on the other hand, as in the instant
case, the judge is elsewhere at the time he formulates his decision and
sends the same in by mail, there is no judgment until he, or an appropriate
substitute, returns and reconvenes the court into proper session at the
proper place. On that basis, the court held the final judgment in the
instant case had not been "entered" until June 24th, for which reason
the motion to dismiss the appeal had, properly, been denied.
DIVORCE--ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTYWHETHER OR NOT RETROACTIVE EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE STATUTORY AMENDMENT DESIGNED TO PRESERVE LUMP-Sum SETTLEMENTS FROM
THE CONSEQUENCE OF REMARRIAGE--In the recent case of Walters v. Walters,' the plaintiff, in 1946, had been awarded a divorce under a decree
which contained a provision for the payment of a specified sum of money
in installments. Later that year, the defendant filed a petition for modification of the decree in the form of cancellation of the obligation to make
The trial court
the payments because of the plaintiff's remarriage.
granted the requested relief but the Appellate Court for the First District
reversed on the ground that the provision was in the nature of a lump7 The case had seemingly turned on a question as to the construction to be given
to the language contained in the policy. That aspect of the case is discussed in a
note to the decision of the Appellate Court to be found in 29 CmCAGo-KENT LAw
REvIEw 18-9. Presumably, if the declaratory judgment proceeding had sought a
determination as to the company's freedom from liability because of fraud or mistake, the action would have possessed the character of a suit in equity for rescission
or reformation.
8 The statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1, recognizes the possibility
for differentiation among types of declaratory judgment proceedings for it calls for
trial by jury of disputed issues of fact where such method of determination is
customary. Pleading and other procedural questions may turn on the distinction
made in the instant case.
1341 Ill. App. 561, 94 N. E. (2d) 726 (1949). Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a concurring
opinion. Feinberg, J., dissented.
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sum settlement, 2 even though payable in installments, rather than one
for alimony. The plaintiff was, therefore, held entitled to the continued
receipt of the sums even though her marital status had been altered.
The decision is in conformity with the spirit of the 1949 amendment to
Section 18 of the Divorce Act,3 which provision now requires the continuation of payment, despite remarriage of the recipient, of any lump-sum
settlement, including those payable in installments. That amendment was,
in all probability, enacted to prevent the recurrence of decisions, such as
had been reached by certain of the Appellate Courts, to the effect that
such settlements, if payable in installments, were converted into and
were to be treated as alimony.4 The majority of the court mentioned,
but declined to apply, the amended section on the basis that it was unnecessary to do so. Taking this position, it found it unnecessary to consider whether the amendment possessed retroactive effect. Judge Niemeyer,
in his concurring opinion, felt the court should have stressed the statute
to bolster its decision.5
The significance of the position taken in the concurring opinion could
the more readily be grasped if one would consider that it could conceivably affect innumerable divorce decrees entered before the passage
of the 1949 amendment. Just such a situation existed in another recent
case, that of Coleman v. Coleman.' The facts therein parallelled those of
the Walters case in that the decree and the petition for modification came
before the passage of the 1949 amendment, and the decree provided for
a settlement similar to the one described in that case. The Appellate
Court for the Fourth District, however, interpreted the decretal provision
as being one for alimony rather than a lump-sum settlement and ordered
a termination of payments on evidence of the wife's remarriage. In arriving at that decision, the court refused to give retroactive effect to the
1949 amendment. If it had done so, the result reached might well have
been different since it would then have been confronted with an express
legislative mandate designed to fit the situation presented to the court.
2 This conclusion was apparently based on two factors present in the decree,
to-wit: (1) the settlement was for a specific total sum; (2) any unpaid balance, in
event of the premature death of the ex-husband, was to be a charge against his
estate.
3 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
4 See, for example, Hotzfleld v. Hotzfleld, 336 Ill. App. 238, 83 N. E. (2d) 605
(1948); Banck v. Banck, 332 Ill. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944); Adler v.
Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940).
5 Since no legislative intent allowing retroactive application was shown, the conclusion is difficult to justify. For the necessity of such a showing, see Hathaway v.
Merchants' Loan & T. Co., 218 Ill. 580, 75 N. E. 1060 (1905) ; Gage v. Stewart, 127
Ill. 207, 19 N. E. 702 (1889).
6 341 Ill. App. 462, 94 N. E. (2d) 507 (1949).

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE AND DisSOLUTION-WHETHER THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE TERMS OF ANNEXATION
IN

THE

INITIATING

ORDINANCE

VOIDS

THE ARRANGEMENT

EVEN THOUGH

THE VOTERS APPROVE THE ACTION-The councils of both the plaintiff city
and the defendant city, in the recent case of City of Nameoki v. Granite
City,1 passed ordinances authorizing special elections to determine whether
the former should be annexed to the latter. A majority of those casting
votes at each election approved the proposed action. The plaintiff city
thereafter commenced suit requesting an injunction to restrain the defendant and its officers from assuming control over the former's government, property and affairs. The complaint alleged that neither ordinance
specified the terms of the annexation, as is required by statute, 2 for which
reason the whole arrangement was void. The "terms" referred to were
those dealing with the disposition to be made of the annexed municipality's
property, debts, public facilities and the like. The trial court dismissed
the suit on motion and, upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court because
a franchise was involved, that decision was affirmed.'
The higher court took the position that the mere failure to recite the
terms of annexation in the ordinances did not void the action taken
since other sections of the statute could be looked to in order to provide
the missing information. It is true that the legislature, after outlining
two methods for annexation, had included a statement of the manner in
which the existing debts and facilities of the annexed municipality were
to be handled.4 Due to the physical arrangement of this particular portion
of the statute, 5 however, it might appear that these provisions are applicable only where annexation occurs by the second method, the one not
utilized in the instant case. There is further basis for differentiation in
the fact that the second manner of procedure does not allow the municipalities any opportunity to agree as to the terms for the election thereunder is to be ordered by the county court upon petition by the requisite
number of voters. It was held, however, that the sections referred to are
1408 Ill. 33, 95 N. E. (2d) 920 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 7-12.
3 The trial court decision may have rested on the proposition that plaintiff chose
the wrong remedy, having used a proceeding in equity rather than quo warranto,
permitted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 112, § 9(a). The Supreme Court, while
noting that equity does not take jurisdiction merely to inquire Into the legality of
an election deemed the remedy appropriate as property rights were involved:
Village of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, 255 Ill. 190, 99 N. E. 388 (1912).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 7-15 to § 7-20 inclusive and §§ 7-35, 7-38,
7-39.
5 These provisions follow immediately upon the sections outlining the second
method of annexation.
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not restricted in their application to situations where the annexation
occurs through the intervention of the county court, but are equally
applicable to either method of annexation.6
NAMES--ASSUMED NAMES-WHETHER
WHO

HAS

FAILED

TO

COMPLY

WITH

OR NOT CONTRACT MADE BY ONE

STATUTE

REGULATING USE OF

ASSUMED NAME IS VALID AND ENFoRcIBLE--The

AN

plaintiff in Grody v.

Scalone,' conducting his business under the designation of "Modern Furnace Company," sought to recover a balaance allegedly due for the installation of a furnace in the defendant's residence. The answer admitted
the existence of the contract, denied the other items in the complaint, and
set up as an affirmative defense the fact that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with the registration requirements of the Illinois Assumed Name
Act.2 It was contended that since the plaintiff had violated the statute
he was not lawfully in business and therefore any agreement he had
entered into was unenforcible as being contrary to public policy. The
trial court sustained this argument and the case was taken directly to the
Supreme Court on a claim that the statute was unconstitutional. The
higher court circumvented the constitutional issue by holding that noncompliance with the statutory provisions regulating the use of assumed
names did not affect the enforcibility of contracts or obligations entered
into by persons otherwise subject to the regulation of the statute. An
identical result was reached, on similar facts, in the later Supreme
Court case of Cohen v. Lerhman.3 The court, in reaching its decision
in these two cases, found that no other result would be consistent with
legislative intent. It reasoned that, since the only penalty set out in the
statute is one designed to punish the violator by a fine or imprisonment,4
the legislature did not intend any other consequence to attach to a failure
to comply with the law. A contrary result which had been attained in
two prior Appellate Court decisions has thus been repudiated.5
6 It is to be noted that Section 7-15, having to do with the debts of the annexed
municipality, restricts its applicability to annexation on petition. As the other
sections are not so specifically restricted, the court reasonably concluded that they
were not subject to restraint but could, and did, apply to both types of proceeding.
1408 Ill. 61, 96 N. E. (2d) 97 (1950), noted in 39 111. B. J. 308.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq.
3 408 Ill. 155, 96 N. E. (2d) 528 (1951).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 8.
5 Mickelson v. Kolb, 337 Ill. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted in 27
CHCAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 327. See also Franks v. Coront, 341 Il1. App. 137,
93 N. E. (2d) 157 (1950).
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TAXATION-LEACY, INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER TAXES-WHETHER IT
IS PROPER TO DEDUCT A PRO-RATA SHARE OF ALL DEBTS AND EXPENSES FROM
THE

VALUE OF

PAYABLE

BY

LOCAL

PROPERTY

IN

COMPUTING

THE INHERITANCE

A NON-RESIDENT DECEDENT'S ESTATF--The case of In

TAX

Re

Geatty's Estate1 presented a problem which arose out of an ancillary
administration proceeding commenced in Illinois. The decedent, a resident of Maryland, died, leaving assets in both jurisdictions. The local
administrator filed an inheritance tax return, 2 listing the property subject
to the Illinois tax, and deducted from the gross value 42.55% of all the
debts payable out of the estate together with the expense of administering
it both in Illinois and Maryland. He proceeded on the theory that the
Illinois assets were 42.55% of all the property left and therefore should
bear that percentage of debts and expenses as far as the tax calculation
was concerned. The Attorney General objected to this method of computation and subsequently the estate filed an amended return wherein
only the Illinois debts and administration expenses were subtracted. However, in the latter was included the entire amount of the Federal Estate
Tax,' and once more the Attorney General took exception. The county
judge assessed the tax on the basis of the original return, and upon
appeal by the state to the county court 4 the order was affirmed. A
further appeal was perfected, this time directly to the Supreme Court as
a question of revenue was involved, and again the percentage deductions
were sustained.
In computing the inheritance tax in instances where the decedent
is a non-resident, one of two methods is typically utilized in ascertaining
the amount of the debts and expenses which are deductible. The first
allows only the subtraction of local debts and administrative expenditures, while the second, the one adopted in the principal case, permits
a pro-rata deduction of all such items without regard to their situs.1 In
choosing the latter as the appropriate rule to be followed, the Supreme
Court took into consideration the fact that the adoption of the former
would allow the estate to reduce the tax basis by the full amount of the
federal Estate Tax. This, it was reasoned, might result in duplicate deductions, the estate taking advantage of the federal tax twice: once in the
1408 Ill. 383, 97 N. E. (2d) 307 (1951), noted in 39 Ill. B. J. 518.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375 et seq. The tax is calculated on the amount of property which
has a tax situs in the state minus debts and administration expenditures.
3 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the full amount of the federal Estate
Tax is deductible even though the decedent had been possessed of property in sister
states: People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861 (1927).
4 The Act provides for such procedure: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 385.
5 61 C. J., Taxation, § 2604.
2 This was in compliance with the state inheritance tax act,
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main administrative proceeding in Maryland, and once in the ancillary
proceeding in Illinois. The court felt that it was under a duty to attempt
to prevent this possibility.6
The Supreme Court did, however, foresee one difficulty which might
arise if the pro-rata method was used indiscriminately and without regard
to the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, if the local debts and
expenses were larger than the allowable pro-rata deductions, the result
would be what the court termed "indirect taxation." In effect, the state
would be receiving more than its share since the entire amount of the
debts and expenses which were proper incidents of this jurisdiction would
not be subtracted from the value of the property located within its boundaries.7 As the record in this particular case did not indicate that indirect taxation would occur, it was decided that there was no necessity to
design a solution for such a problem at this time.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF ACT ON OTHER STATUTORY OR
COMMON

LAW RIGHTS

oF

ACTION AND

DEFENSES-WHETHER

STATE

RE-

LINQUISHES RIGHT OF SUBROGATION BY OFFSETTING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AGAINST STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM BENEFITS-In the

recent case of Weaver v. Hodge,' it appeared that after the death of her

husband, a former employee of the State of Illinois who had been negligently killed in the course of his employment, the widow sought to collect
her claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act " and also under the
Illinois Retirement System Act.' Following determination of her claim
under each of these respective statutes, she received payment in full of
the workmen's compensation claim and payment of her entitlement under
the retirement system, but payment of the latter was reduced by a set-off
6Tbe extent to which this objective was attained depends upon the Maryland
method of computation. Thus, if that state did not apply pro-rata apportionment,
a degree of duplication in the deduction of the Federal Estate Tax would still occur.
The possibility of duplicate deductions did not deter the court from allowing the

subtraction of the entire federal tax in People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E.
861 (1927).

It is to be noted that the decedent in that case, unlike the one in the

present, was a resident of Illinois and the main administration of the estate
occurred here. Thus it is readily apparent that the entire tax expense had a direct
point of incidence in this jurisdiction whereas the same is not true in situations
involving non-resident decedents where only ancillary proceedings occur in this
state. It would, therefore, appear reasonable to suggest that the instant decision
will have no effect upon the established rule that the federal Estate Tax can be
deducted in its entirety where a resident decedent's estate is involved. See 39 Ill.
B. J. 518 at 519.
7 For a situation of this type involving a resident decedent, see Connell v. Crosby,
210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350 (1904).
1406 Ill. 537, 94 N. E. (2d) 297 (1950).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138 et seq.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 215 et seq.
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of the amount paid under the workmen's compensation award.4 Thereafter, the administrator of the deceased employee secured a judgment in
an action against the tort-feasors responsible for the death and the proceeds of that judgment were paid to the Clerk of the court. Upon petition
to distribute these proceeds, the State of Illinois sought leave to intervene
and to enforce a lien to reimburse it for the unsatisfied remainder of the
award it had been forced to pay under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.5 The lower court denied such request and the state appealed directly
to the Supreme Court., That court decided that a proper interpretation
of the two statutes involved would necessarily lead to the result that the
governmental employer had made an election to utilize the payments it
had made under the Workmen's Compensation Act in order to reduce
the obligation created by the Retirement System Act. To permit the
state to then enforce a lien upon the wrongful death judgment would,
in effect, provide it with duplicate reimbursement. While the case dealt
only with an issue involving a public employer, it poses a nice question
as to whether or not the same result would follow if a private employer,
operating a pension or benefit fund, should become involved in a similar
situation.'

4 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 225, directs that any amounts provided for the benefit of
a dependent of a system member, whether under the provisions of the state Workmen's Compensation Act or the state Occupational Disease Act, shall be applied as
an off-set against the amount due for any accidental death benefit, the off-set to be

made in such manner as the retirement board may direct.

5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166, provides for a lien In favor of an
employer who has paid a workmen's compensation award.
6 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, authorizes a direct appeal where the state is a party.
7 See Campbell, "Subrogation Under Workmen's Compensation-Too Much or Too
Little," 18 CHicA~o-KF.NT LAw REviEw 225-47 (1940).

